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Joseph A. v. Gina L.: The Suit Must Go On
I. Introduction
One of the many social changes the United States has ex-
perienced in the past three decades is a dramatic rise in the
number of births to unmarried women.1 This development is
particularly significant in view of the disproportionately high
percentage of unmarried women and their children who can be
classified as living "below the poverty line."' 2 Many of these fam-
ilies require state assistance when the fathers provide no mone-
tary support.3
A concern for the "public purse" and the desire to indem-
nify it against the necessity of support for women and children,
led to the evolution of modern paternity proceedings, which es-
tablish paternity through orders of filiation.4 These orders are
1. In 1950, the Census Bureau reported that a total of four percent of all live births
were to unmarried women. By 1970, that number had risen to 10.7%. At the last census
in 1980, the percentage had nearly doubled again to 18.4%, with an almost 100% in-
crease among white women. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1984 at 70 (104th ed. 1983). See also Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 402 n.2 (1979) (citing National Center for Health Statistics,
in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE., 27 VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, No. 11 at 19
(1979)) (statistics indicating that illegitimate births comprised over 15% of all births in
the United States in 1977).
2. In 1979, the Census Bureau reported that 287,300 single mother families were
living at or below the poverty level in New York. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK 507 (1982).
Moreover, among female-headed households, never-married women comprised the
second-largest percentage in poverty, in 1978. NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY, WOMEN IN POVERTY, reprinted in 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 925, 927 (1982)
(citing 1978 Poverty Rates of Female-Headed Families, by Marital Status in BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 124, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1978 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN IN
POVERTY]).
3. A national survey taken in 1975 found that only 25% of those eligible to receive
child support payments actually did receive them; and 60% of those who did receive
support received less than $1500. WOMEN IN POVERTY, supra note 2, at 928 (citing Schul-
man, Poor Women and Family Law, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1069 (1981)).
4. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 511 (McKinney 1983) grants exclusive, original jurisdiction
over paternity proceedings to the family courts. It states, in relevant part: "Except as
otherwise provided, the family court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to
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entered after petitioners meet the burden of providing clear and
convincing evidence. They may be accompanied by orders of
support.5 In 1984, the evolutionary process went a step further.
In Joseph A. v. Gina L.,6 a putative father filed a paternity peti-
tion in the Family Court of Westchester County. The court con-
tinued the proceeding and granted a nunc pro tunc order of filia-
tion, adjudicating paternity after the death of the petitioner.7 In
its decision, the court held that Family Court Act section 518,8
dealing with the non-abatement aspects of paternity proceedings
must be read as gender-neutral.9
Part II of this Casenote sets forth the legal background of
paternity proceedings brought by both mothers and fathers,
tracing the development from the common law through the ex-
pansion of the statutory rights of the parties, and including the
United States Supreme Court decisions that are reflected in the
changing New York law. Part III discusses the factual back-
ground of Joseph A. and summarizes the opinion of the court.
Part IV analyzes the decision on constitutional grounds and the
ramifications of the court's interpretation of the statute, con-
cluding that, while section 518 does violate the equal protection
clause, orders of filiation entered after the death of the putative
father must be statutorily severed from orders of support in or-
der to ensure adequate protection of the rights of the father. Fi-
nally, Part V recommends that the Legislature take appropriate
establish paternity and, in any such proceedings in which it makes a finding of paternity,
to order support and to make orders of custody or of visitation, as set forth in this
article."
See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), which grants
authority to the surrogate to make necessary findings of paternity that arise in the
course of adoption proceedings.
5. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 511 (McKinney 1983).
6. 126 Misc. 2d 63, 481 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Fam. Ct. Westchester County 1984).
7. Id. at 69, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The order was not accompanied by an order of
support.
8. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 518 (McKinney 1983) reads:
If, at any time before or after a petition is filed, the mother dies or becomes men-
tally ill or cannot be found within the state, neither the proceeding nor the right
to commence the proceeding shall abate but may be commenced or continued by
any of the persons authorized by this article to commence a paternity proceeding.
For a discussion of § 518, see infra notes 113-44 and accompanying text.
9. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08. In Joseph A., the peti-
tioner was the father. Many more cases are commenced by mothers. The gender-neutral
reading of § 518 covers these situations as well.
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action to rectify the uncertain status of orders of filiation, typi-
fied in Joseph A., in which orders of filiation are sought for rea-
sons other than support.
II. Background
A. Evolution of Paternity Proceedings
1. Early English Law
Blackstone defined a child born out of wedlock10 as one "not
only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony."'" The com-
mon law of England considered an out-of-wedlock child to be
"filius nullius" (no one's child).' 2 No laws existed regarding the
support of illegitimate children, and, indeed, no one was obli-
gated to support them. 13 Illegitmate children relied on the
church and the towns for their support. 4 The first statute im-
posing any obligation on a putative father was enacted in 1574."5
This statute enabled the parishes to obtain bastardy orders obli-
gating putative fathers to pay money that was used to care for
the children.'6 Despite the statutorily-imposed tie between fa-
ther and child, the child remained "filius nullius." It was not
until 1883 that British courts acknowledged that an out-of-wed-
10. New York law mandates the use of the term "child born out of wedlock" as a
specific replacement for the labels of "bastard" and "illegitimate" in all local laws and
public documents. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 59 (McKinney 1951). The terms "il-
legitmate" and "bastard" are used solely in their historical context.
11. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *454-55.
12. Id. at *459. Alternatively, an illegitmate child was known as "filius populi," the
son of the people. But see Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181, 189 (1884) (recognizing that an
illegitimate child "may acquire rights").
13. Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. at 189.
14. J. TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 60 (1982). For a com-
plete discussion of the treatment of out-of-wedlock children in an historical context, see
id. at 53-50. See also, Comment, The Sins of the Fathers, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1017, 1019
(1983).
15. J. TEICHMAN, supra note 14, at 61. There is, however, a discrepancy in the date
of the enactment of the statute among several sources. Blackstone cites to the statute as
enacted in 1575, 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *459. Duerr v. Whittmann, 5 A.D.2d
326 (1st Dep't 1958), refers to the statute as enacted in 1576. Id. at 329.
16. J. TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY at 61. A bastardy order was obtainable at the request
of a parish officer, provided that the mother of the child swore on oath that a particular
man was the father. Id. at 64. For a discussion of the procedures and enforcement of
bastardy orders, see W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *458.
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lock child had any legal parentage whatsoever. 17
2. Filiation Proceedings in New York Courts
a. Transition from Criminal to Family Courts
New York, like many other United States jurisdictions, tra-
ditionally followed the common law rule that fathers of out-of-
wedlock children were not responsible for their support., The
first New York statutes to impose any liability for the support of
out-of-wedlock children were criminal in nature. 9 These stat-
utes, enacted to protect the public coffers from undue financial
drain,2" set out criminal procedures to be followed when the
mother or a state official commenced paternity proceedings."
Even the courts, however, recognized that filiation proceedings
were "not a prosecution for the punishment of a crime."22 Pater-
nity proceedings were classified as "a creature sui generis . . .
quasi-criminal . . . special proceedings of a criminal nature."23
Nevertheless, until 1962, paternity proceedings continued to be
conducted in the Courts of Special Sessions in New York City,
and the Children's Courts elsewhere in New York.2 In that year,
17. The Queen v. Nash, 10 Q.B.D. 454 (1883) (holding that the mother of an out-of-
wedlock child was entitled to issue a writ of habeas corpus in respect of the child).
18. See, e.g., People ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, 216 N.Y. 527, 532-33, 111 N.E. 50, 51-52
(1917) (emphasizing that liability in paternity actions existed solely by virtue of the
criminal law and must be strictly construed).
19. Id. at 530-31, 111 N.E. at 51. The criminal sections dealing with filiation covered
the issuance of warrants and the procedure for subsequent arrest; the trial procedure;
the orders of support; and the indemnification of the county for any expense occurred on
behalf of the child, or its mother during her confinement. Id., Ill N.E. at 51-52.
20. E.g., Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Simon, 270 N.Y. 188, 192, 200 N.E. 781,
783 (1936) ("The [predecessor to article 5 of the Family Court Act] apparently was en-
acted to give the procedure in these paternity proceedings whereby the public might be
relieved from the support of those liable to become public charges.").
21. The criminal procedures are discussed in Duerr v. Wittmann, 5 A.D.2d 326, 171
N.Y.S.2d 444 (lst Dep't. 1958). These included provisions for the issuance of a warrant
for the apprehension of a defendant after a paternity complaint was filed, as well as ex
parte judgments; and the requisite standard of proof. Id. at 328-29, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 446-
47.
22. Id. at 329, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The court based this conclusion upon the dis-
tinction that "criminal actions [are] . . . for the purpose of imposing punishment ..
Id. at 328, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47.
23. Id. at 330, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
24. For a discussion of the jurisdiction of both these courts, see Czajak v. Vavonese,
104 Misc. 2d 601, 604 n.1, 428 N.Y.S.2d 986, 988 n.1 (Fain. Ct. Onondaga County 1980).
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exclusive original jurisdiction was granted to the family courts
under the newly-enacted Family Court Act, which incorporated
relevant provisions of the Children's Court Acts and the Domes-
tic Relations Court Act.2 5
Transfer of jurisdiction to the family court prompted new
recognition of the purposes of filiation proceedings. They were
no longer viewed as criminal in nature but rather were viewed as
proceedings to establish rights. In ABC v. XYZ,2 6 for example,
the family court noted that filiation proceedings had a twofold
purpose. They determine paternity and secure support for an
out-of-wedlock child.17 Although the court held that the pater-
nity proceeding was barred by the statute of limitations,28 the
court did not say that a support agreement would bar a subse-
quent paternity action. The court noted: "[T]he law does not
and should not look with favor upon suspending the question of
parentage of a child in limbo particularly where the child upon a
judicial declaration of paternity may enjoy substantial rights. '2 9
The court concluded that orders of filiation are not dependent
upon an adjudication of a child's right to support from his puta-
tive father.
In Kordek v. Wood,30 the appellate division held that the
family court has, by virtue of section 511 of the Family Court
Act, jurisdiction to make orders of support or custody or visita-
tion. 1 It noted that the benefits of orders of filiation included
25. The Family Court Act, ch. 686, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043.
26. 50 Misc. 2d 792, 271 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
27. Id. at 795-96, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 784. See also Jean C. v. Andrew B., 86 A.D.2d 891,
891, 447 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (2d Dep't 1982) ("The statutory scheme for paternity pro-
ceedings, as set forth in Article 5 of the Family Court Act, was enacted to provide for the
financial welfare of the child, as well as to insure that 'paternity should be established
with the greatest care.' "). Contra Czajak v. Vavonese, 104 Misc. 2d at 601, 428 N.Y.S.2d
at 986. Czajak held that the provisions of article 5 relating to paternity were for the
purposes of establishing support only, and the family courts had no jurisdiction to deter-
mine the status of either the child or the father. Id. at 601, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 986. The
court went on to distinguish legitimation from filiation, noting that only legitimation can
alter or determine the legal status of the child. It outlined some of the ways in which
legitimation can occur, such as the marriage of the parents, adoption or by declaratory
judgment in the supreme court. Id. at 605-06, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
28. ABC, 50 Misc. 2d at 798, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
29. Id. at 796-97, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
30. 90 A.D.2d 209, 457 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep't 1982).
31. Id. at 211, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 158. For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
1985]
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establishing certain concomitant rights, such as rights of inheri-
tance, rights to recover benefits, and the right to notice of adop-
tion proceedings.32 Thus, the Kordek court concluded that "the
child's need for support no longer bears a nexus to the granting"
of an order of filiation 33
In Brooks v. Willie,3 4 the family court noted another pur-
pose served by orders of filiation. The court found that the "col-
lateral powers expressly or impliedly found in article 5... can
otherwise serve to satisfy the 'protection of the child' purpose of
paternity proceedings. '35 Thus, the family court had the ability
to enter an order to "insure that in the care, protection, disci-
pline and guardianship of the child, his religious faith shall be
preserved and protected."3 In Brooks, the family court relied on
this rationale to protect the child from the "recognizable stigma
that attaches to illegitimacy, '3 7 by amending the child's birth
record so that it included the name of his father.38
Although recognizing the varied purposes of filiation orders,
the courts generally considered that the primary purpose of filia-
tion statutes was to determine the liability for and the adequacy
of orders of support.3 " Petitions that did not request orders of
support could be directed to the supreme court because they
were considered to be outside the jurisdiction of the family
court.40 This principle is still the prevailing view.
32. Id. at 212, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
33. Id. at 213, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
34. 117 Misc. 2d 640, 458 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Fam. Ct. Suffolk County 1983).
35. Id. at 643, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
36. Id. at 643-44, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 551(h) (Mc-
Kinney 1983), which permits the courts to enter orders of protection in assistance or as a
condition of any other order made).
37. Id. at 645, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
38. Id. at 646, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 864. Contra Dana A. v. Harry M., 113 Misc. 2d 635,
449 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (In the absence of a specific grant of
power, the family court had no jurisdiction to change the child's surname.).
39. See, e.g., Czajak v. Vavonese, 104 Misc. 2d at 607, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 990. The
court in Czajak emphasized the importance of support by discussing the possibility of
issuing a support order or approving a support agreement, even in circumstances where
no order of filiation was made. Id. See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 523 (McKinney 1983),
which provides that the petition shall state "why the court should not enter a declaration
of paternity, an order of support, and such other further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances."
40. For example, in Edward K. v. Marcy R., 106 Misc. 2d 506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 108
(Fam. Ct. Kings County 1980), the court reiterated that the principal purpose of pater-
[Vol. 5:461
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However, it is far from universally accepted. For instance, in
Joye v. Schechter,"' the family court totally rejected the conclu-
sion that the lack of a support demand warrants dismissal."2 The
court in Joye held that support was just one of many rights, in-
terests and obligations created once a court makes an order of
filiation. 3 It concluded that an order of filiation is separate and
distinct from any order of support, visitation, or protection;"
4
and that neither party may have a petition dismissed because of
a failure to demand support. 5
This view was confirmed by the appellate division in
Kordek v. Wood." It held that the plain language of Family
Court Act section 511 did not condition jurisdiction upon a find-
ing of financial need. 7 It concluded that "[t]he evolution of the
provisions governing paternity proceedings into their present-
day form and of the myriad rights which flow from a filiation
order clearly indicates that the child's need for support no
longer bears a nexus to the granting of such an order.' '48
The confusion of the courts regarding the issue is evident in
nity is to "resolve problems of support." Id. at 507, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 109. Therefore, the
court dismissed a paternity petition that did not contain a formal request for support.
The court considered that a paternity petition, unaccompanied by a request for support,
is tantamount to a petition for declaratory relief, and directed the parties to the supreme
court. Id. at 508, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
The supreme court has jurisdiction to grant relief under § 3001 of the Civil Practice
Laws and Rules, which provides:
The supreme court may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a
final judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justicia-
ble controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. If the court
declines to render such a judgment, it shall state its grounds.
N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 3001 (McKinney 1974). The Family Court Act has no comparable
provision.
For cases that disagree with this rationale, see Kordek v. Wood, 90 A.D.2d 209, 211,
457 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (4th Dep't 1982) (Jurisdiction is not conditioned upon a finding of
financial need.); Joye v. Schechter, 112 Misc. 2d 172, 178, 446 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Fain.
Ct. Nassau County 1982) (The purpose of a paternity proceeding is to determine the
father of the child.).
41. 112 Misc. 2d 172, 446 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County 1982).
42. Id. at 177, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88.
43. Id. at 178, 446 N.Y.S.d at 888.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 179, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
46. 90 A.D.2d 209, 457 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep't 1982).
47. Id. at 211, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 158. For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
48. Id. at 213, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
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Michael B. v. Sendi Diann W.49 There the family court reiter-
ated the holding in Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Koeh-
ler:50 the purpose of filiation is to impose liability for support
only. The court in Michael B. noted that Koehler is in fact the
Court of Appeals' last word on this issue.5 1 Conceding that vari-
ous legislative amendments to article 5 may have dated Koehler,
it urged the Legislature to "clarify the question of whether or
not it intended to establish article 5 as a status proceeding,
thereby changing the import of Koehler."52 And it warned that
if the Legislature failed to do so, "the prevailing confusion may
well deteriorate into chaos."53
b. Persons who may originate proceedings
The criminal statutes, and their civil law successors, gave
the courts jurisdiction to establish paternity and to provide for
the support of natural children 54 and their mothers. A statutory
duty was imposed on the fathers of these children where the
common law had held the father to no such liability.5 5 Until
1976, however, proceedings could only be brought by the mother
or her representative, or by a public official .5  Fathers were not
permitted to petition for orders of filiation. 7
49. 121 Misc. 2d 475, 467 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
50. 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E.2d 587 (1940). See infra note 54.
51. Michael B. v. Sendi Diann W., 121 Misc. 2d at 478 n.*, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 1011 n.1.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The New York City criminal statutes defined a natural child as one "begotten
and born . . . out of lawful matrimony." Act 14, 1930, ch. 434, § 35-a, 1930 N.Y. Laws
908, 909. The New York statutes today refer to children "born out of wedlock." N.Y.
GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 59 (McKinney 1951). Article 5 of the Family Court Act uses the
word "child" to refer to a child born out of wedlock. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 512(b) (McKin-
ney 1983).
55. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 513 (McKinney 1983) states in relevant part: "Each parent
of a child born out of wedlock is liable for the necessary support and education of the
child and for the child's funeral expenses."
56. THE FAMILY COURT AcT, ch. 686, § 522, 1962 N.Y. LAWS 3043, 3096. Public wel-
fare officials could commence paternity proceedings if the child or its mother was or was
likely to become a public charge. Id.
57. But a putative father could contract voluntarily to pay fof the support of an
acknowledged child, a process termed "buying his peace." In re Cirillo's Estate, 114
N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (1952). In such a case, the agreement itself measured the limits of the
father's liability. Id. This type of support obligation normally ended at the father's
death.
[Vol. 5:461
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In 1976, Family Court Act section 522 was amended to in-
clude "a person alleging to be the father, whether a minor or
not."58 At the same time, the legislature amended section 517,
which provides the statute of limitations that governs com-
mencement of paternity proceedings. 9 The new section gave the
putative father the right to originate a paternity proceeding at
any time prior to the child's eighteenth birthday. 0 The mother's
right to bring a paternity action terminates five years after the
birth of the child.'
The constitutionality of the differing statutes of limitation
for the commencement of paternity actions by mothers and fa-
thers was upheld in Joye v. Schechter.62 In Joye, the family
court held that the inherent differences in position between
mothers and fathers, including the fact that a father has no no-
tice of his paternity until the mother advises him, justifies dispa-
rate treatment. 3 In addition, the court noted that mothers and
fathers seek different objectives when they bring 'paternity ac-
tions 4 and therefore, it is reasonable to "grant a purported fa-
ther. . . a longer period of time to institute a paternity proceed-
ing."" Thus, the putative father had standing to bring a
paternity proceeding four years after the birth of the child.6
B. Burden of Proof
While filiation proceedings were initially criminal in nature,
petitioners were never held to a standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Ryan, 7
58. Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 6, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1, 4.
59. Id.
60. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517(c) (McKinney 1983). The statute states in relevant part:
"If the petitioner is . . . alleging to be the father, the proceeding may be originated at
any time prior to the child's eighteenth birthday."
61. Id. § 517(a). The statute provides: "Proceedings to establish the paternity of a
child may be instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or after the birth of the
child, but shall not be brought after . . . more than five years from the birth of the
child."
62. 112 Misc. 2d 172, 175-77, 446 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Faro. Ct. Nassau County 1982).
63. Id. at 175,-446 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
64. Id. at 175-76, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
65. Id. at 176, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
66. Id. at 179, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89.
67. 238 A.D. 607, 265 N.Y.S. 286 (1st Dep't 1933).
1985]
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the appellate division stated that "the rule requiring proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is limited to purely criminal trials" and
it refused to further extend it.6 8 However, it recognized that al-
though filiation was quasi-criminal, 9 it was a "charge .. . so
easily made and so difficult of satisfactory answer by the defen-
dant, and the consequences of conviction are so serious."7 Thus,
Ryan held that the petitioner must meet a standard "stricter
than [a] mere preponderance of the evidence and yet not so ex-
acting as to eliminate all reasonable doubt ...evidence suffi-
cient to create a genuine belief in the mind of the trier of the
facts that the defendant is the father of the child."71
Many years later, when paternity proceedings were consid-
ered to be civil in nature, the courts continued to accept the
standard of proof described in Ryan. In Commissioner of Public
Welfare v. Wentlandt 2 for example, the appellate division held
that the petitioner's burden of proof in filiation proceedings was
that such proof must be "entirely satisfactory. '73 It found that
this standard was analagous to a requirement of "clear and con-
vincing proof," clearly less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.74 Applying this standard to the facts of Wentlandt, the
appellate division ordered a new trial. The respondent appealed
an order of filiation on the grounds that he had been sterilized.
The appellate division was not convinced that the evidence
presented at trial was entirely satisfactory.75
In Edick v. Martin, the appellate division reiterated this
standard, holding that petitioner's testimony that she had had
sexual relations with every man she ever dated, and that she had
lived with the respondent's brother until four months prior to
her pregnancy, sufficiently weakened her testimony that the bur-
den was not met.77 In addition, in Margie L. v. Gary M.,7 8 the
68. Id. at 608, 265 N.Y.S. at 287-88.
69. Id., 265 N.Y.S. at 288.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 25 A.D.2d 640, 268 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1966).
73. Id. at 641, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 642, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
76. 34 A.D.2d 1096, 312 N.Y.S.2d 427 (4th Dep't 1970).
77. Id. at 1096-97, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
78. 46 A.D.2d 935, 361 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep't 1974).
[Vol. 5:461
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appellate division held that the petitioner's inability to explain a
gestation period of only 259 days, in the absence of hospital
records that indicated prematurity, resulted in a failure to prop-
erly meet the burden.9
The appellate courts, however, have noted that "[w]here the
determination rests basically on a resolution of credibility the
finding of the Trial Judge, sitting without jury, is accorded great
weight." 80 Therefore, a lack of evidence concerning whether
other men had access to the petitioner has been held to be suffi-
cient to sustain an order of filiation.8 1 In fact, it has been estab-
lished that, although petitioner "had the continuing burden...
[putative father's] tacit admission of intercourse on or about the
date of conception obligated him to go forward with some com-
petent proof to show access to petitioner by another individual
during that period. '82
Petitioner's burden of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence may be met by the showing of one or more other factors.
Often, results of human leukocyte antigen blood tissue tests
(HLA tests) are received in evidence. 8 In admitting evidence of
a 99.4% probability result of one such test, the appellate divi-
sion, in Bowling ex rel. Morgan v. Coney,8 held that petitioner's
burden was met because "this test is highly accurate on the issue
of paternity, and should be accorded great weight . . . . Evi-
dence such as visits to the hospital, occasional provision of
79. Id., 361 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43.
80. Nancy V. v. Raymond E. C., 75 A.D.2d 599, 599, 426 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (2d Dep't
1980).
81. Id., 426 N.Y.S.2d at 806. See also Seeberg v. Davis, 84 A.D.2d 262, 264, 447
N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (1st Dep't 1982) (Respondent's failure to introduce rebuttal evidence
demonstrated that petitioner's burden was met.); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 55 A.D.2d
557, 389 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1st Dep't 1976) (The burden was met because there was no pro-
bative evidence adduced that petitioner had sexual relations with anyone but respondent
during the time in question.).
82. Seeberg v. Davis, 84 A.D.2d at 264, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (Respondent's failure to
deny having had intercourse with respondent was deemed an admission.).
83. In Catherine H. v. James S., 112 Misc. 2d 429, 430, 447 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110 (Kings
County 1982), the court took judicial notice of the legislature's position that HLA test
results may be admitted into evidence. For a discussion of the test and its use in the
courts, see Seider, Who is the Father?, 3 FAM. ADV. 12 (Fall 1980).
84. 91 A.D.2d 1195, 459 N.Y.S.2d 183 (4th Dep't 1983).
85. Id. at 1196, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
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money, 86 or of the father's positive feelings about petitioner and
the baby have also been admitted to help meet the burden.
Lock v. Fisher88 dealt with the burden of proof imposed on
fathers who petition for an order of filiation. The family court
noted that, because critical information regarding the concep-
tion and birth of the child is exclusively within the mother's
knowledge, some courts had suggested that a male petitioner's
burden be reduced to a preponderance of the evidence. 9 How-
ever, the court dismissed that notion, holding that "[tihe fact
that the alleged father may willingly assume a financial burden
is not . . . sufficient reason to risk burdening a child with one
who is not in fact his natural father." 90 It cautioned that "to
protect the child, paternity should be established with the great-
est of care."91 Thus, it reasoned, a petitioner, whether male or
female, can and must meet the same standard of proof.92
C. The Supreme Court Expansion of the Rights of Children
and Putative Fathers
During the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court began
to examine the status of out-of-wedlock children and their fa-
thers. Issues of inheritance, custody, and adoption were held up
to the scrutiny of the equal protection clause.
It is well settled law that, while the fourteenth amendment
does not deny to states the power to treat different classes of
people in different ways, it does deny states the power to legis-
late different treatment "on the basis of criteria wholly unre-
lated to the objective of [the] statute." 93 The Supreme Court has
held that a classification "must rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
86. See Theresa J. v. Troy M., 89 Misc. 2d 909, 910-11, 392 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
87. See Jane L. v. Rodney B., 111 Misc. 2d 761, 765-66, 444 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015-16
(Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
88. 104 Misc. 2d 656, 428 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Fam. Ct. Westchester County 1980).
89. See Jaynes v. Tulla, 70 A.D.2d 680, 416 N.Y.S.2d 357 (3d Dep't 1979); Smith v.
Lane, 101 Misc. 2d 615, 421 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1979).
90. Lock v. Fischer, 104 Misc. 2d at 660, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 661, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
93. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
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legislation." 4
Lalli v. Lalli5 was a constitutional challenge to EPTL 4-1.2,
which required out-of-wedlock children who wished to inherit
from their fathers to furnish an order of filiation, made during
the lifetime of the father in a manner providing by statute.96
The Court held that the statute did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. 7 It reasoned that the states have a considerable in-
terest in providing for a just and orderly disposition of property
at death, and recognized that the procedural burdens placed on
out-of-wedlock children bore a substantial relationship to that
interest.98 The Court held that EPTL 4-1.2 successfully allevi-
ated the plight of illegitimate children, while avoiding the asser-
tion of spurious claims against the estates of putative fathers.99
It noted alternative remedies available to the children, including
most significantly "if necessary to prevent unnecessary injus-
tice," an order of filiation signed nunc pro tunc to a date before
94. Id. at 76 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
95. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). For a complete discussion of the Lalli case and its after-
math, see generally, Note, Illegitimates and Equal Protection, 57 DEN. L.J. 453 (1980).
96. Section 4-1.2 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law read at that time:
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and
his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue may inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during
the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a pro-
ceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from
the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegit-
imate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in
the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only by the
father, and such motion must be made within one year from the entry of such
order.
(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, maternal
kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administration as if the
decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or obtain such let-
ters only if an order of filiation has been made in accordance with the provisions
of subparagraph (2).
Act of Aug. 2, 1966, ch. 952, § 4-1.2, 1966 N.Y. Laws 2761, 3784, amended by Act of Apr.
27, 1967, ch. 686, §§ 28, 29, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1711, 1716-17.
97. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268-71.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 271-72.
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the father's death. 100 Thus, the statute did not create a constitu-
tionally impermissible barrier.
In Stanley v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court took a signifi-
cant step in the development of the rights of unwed fathers.
Stanley challenged an Illinois statute that made out-of-wedlock
children wards of the state upon the death of the mother, with-
out consideration of the fitness of the father to become guardian.
The Court held that "the private interest . . . of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. '"1' 2
The Court noted that "the law has not refused to recognize
those family relationships unlegitimated by [marriage]."'01 3 The
Court did not question the legitimacy of the state's interests in
protecting the welfare of the children, the best interests of the
community and the strengthening of family ties whenever possi-
ble.10 4 Rather, it determined that the statute used to achieve
these ends operated to "spite its own articulated goals" because
it needlessly separated children from their fathers without bene-
fit of a hearing.1°5 It recognized that the statute may have pre-
vented the "administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any
case,"'' 0 but noted that "the Constitution recognizes higher val-
ues than speed and efficiency.' 0 7 The advantage of convenience,
the Court held, was insufficient to justify refusing a father a
hearing when the issue at stake was the dismemberment of his
family.0 8 Thus the Court asserted that it would not ignore the
relationship between a father and his out-of-wedlock children.' 9
Most recently, the Court, in Caban v. Mohammed,"0 dealt
with the unwed father's rights when the out-of-wedlock child
was up for adoption. The Court concluded that the right to
withhold consent, given to mothers, but denied to fathers, cre-
100. Id. at 274.
101. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
102. Id. at 651.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 652.
105. Id. at 652-53.
106. Id. at 656.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 658.
109. Id. at 651-52.
110. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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ated a constitutionally impermissible distinction. The Court re-
jected the state's argument that most unwed fathers neither cre-
ated nor maintained any relationship with their children. It held
that "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance."11' The court cautioned that, even assuming the
state's argument to be valid, the distinction must further the
end of a legitimate state aim, and be sufficiently narrowly
drawn.' 1 2
D. Abatement
At common law, actions generally abated upon the death of
one of the parties. The long-settled rule was that "[w]here
neither common law nor a statute permits the bringing of an
action against the executors or administrators of a deceased resi-
dent, the courts of this State are without jurisdiction to pass
upon such a cause of action." ' 1
New York's Family Court Act section 518 provided the req-
uisite statutory authority to continue paternity actions when the
mother died, or became mentally ill, or could not be found
within the state."4 If a paternity action had started before the
mother's death, any person authorized by law to continue an ac-
tion could do so regardless of the mother's death." 5 But the
non-abatement provision of section 518 had an inherent limita-
tion. The statute did not cover a situation in which the mother
died before the proceeding was commenced.
Despite the seemingly clear language of the statute, the
courts held that the legislative intent behind section 518 permit-
ted commencement, as well as continuance of paternity proceed-
ings after the mother's death. In LaCroix v. Deyo, l i6 the court
held that non-abatement was clearly [contemplated by section
111. Id. at 389.
112. Id. at 391.
113. Id. (quoting Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 383-84, 191 N.E. 23, 24 (1934)).
114. Act of July 24, 1978, ch. 550, § 26, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1, 11, amended by Act of
June 21, 1983, ch. 310, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1664, 1664. "Persons authorized" include
mothers, fathers, and public officials in limited circumstances. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522
(McKinney 1983).
115. "Persons authorized" include mothers, fathers, and public officials in limited
circumstances. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney 1983).
116. 108 Misc. 2d 382, 437 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1981).
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518.117 Thus, section 518 did not prevent a putative father from
commencing an action against the legal representative of the de-
ceased mother's estate when the petitioner did not seek to estab-
lish or support an obligation of support."1 " In a similar set of
circumstances, the family court in Alicia C. ex rel. Zulema C. v.
Evaristo G. 1 9 found that amendments to New York's Estates
Powers and Trusts Law regarding out-of-wedlock children made
the old arguments for abatement less compelling.12 In that case,
the respondent argued that if the legislature intended a cause of
action to survive the death of the mother, whether or not she
filed a paternity petition, it would have said so." l The family
court rejected this argument, holding that a strict and limited
interpretation of the wording of the statute would violate the
equal protection rights of the child. 122
Perhaps in response to Evaristo G., section 518 was
amended to provide specifically that paternity actions com-
menced after the mother's death may be maintained by the pu-
tative father. 2 '
Although the legislature refined the law of abatement as it
pertained to the death of mothers, very little change occurred in
the law of abatement when the putative father dies. Generally,
the courts construed the reference to "mothers" in section 518
as an unambiguous statutory inference for abatement upon the
death of the father. Thus, for example, in Middlebrooks v.
Hatcher,12 the appellate division held that, in the absence of a
117. Id. at 384, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 518. The burden of proof on the father is to estab-
lish paternity by clear and convincing evidence. See supra notes 88-92 and accompany-
ing text.
118. Id. An obligation of support must be created before the parent dies. N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 513 (McKinney 1983), which covers the obligation of support, and enforces an
obligation of support after the death of the parent.
119. 114 Misc. 2d 764, 452 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1982).
120. Id. at 766, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 525. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-
1.2(a)(2)(A),(C) (McKinney 1981), amended by Act of Apr. 8, 1981, ch. 67, § 2, 1981 N.Y.
LAWS 1074, states that for an out-of-wedlock child to inherit, there must have been an
order of filiation made during the lifetime of the father or a "clear and convincing"
showing of an "open and notorious" acknowledgement of the child.
121. Alicia C. ex rel. Zuelma C. v. Evaristo C., 114 Misc. 2d at 766, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
525.
122. Id. at 767, 452, N.Y.S.2d at 525.
123. Act of June 21, 1983, ch. 310, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1664.
124. 55 Misc. 2d 301, 285 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. Suffolk County 1967).
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statutory provision authorizing a paternity proceeding after the
father's death, the proceeding abates on the death of the fa-
ther.125 In Middlebrooks, a paternity proceeding was brought
against the administrator of the putative father's estate. The ap-
pellate division dismissed the action on two grounds. First, it
recognized that filiation statutes are entitled to liberal construc-
tion,' but found no authority for maintaining the action. 12 7
More importantly, the court examined section 4-1.2 of the Es-
tates Powers and Trusts law, which required an order of filiation
to be issued during the father's lifetime, if an illegitimate child
wished to inherit from his fathers. 2 ' Reading the statute to-
gether with section 513 of the Family Court Act,1 9 the court
found their meanings "clear and unambiguous in that they both
call for the entry of an order of filiation during the lifetime of
the putative father."'130
In Corbett v. Corbett,'3' the court was once again asked to
provide an order of filiation against the estate of a deceased re-
spondent.'3  Relying on Middlebrooks, the respondent argued
that EPTL section 4-1.2, recently upheld in Lalli v. Lalli, pre-
cluded the court from declaring paternity after the death of the
father.' 33 The court did not accept this argument, holding in-
stead that, since the family court had no jurisdiction over ad-
ministration of estates, EPTL section 4-1.2 could not prohibit it
from entering an order of filiation after the putative father's
125. Middlebrooks v. Hatcher, 55 Misc. 2d 301, 303, 285 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (Fain.
Ct. Suffolk County 1967). See also Corbett v. Corbett, 100 Misc. 2d 270, 275, 418
N.Y.S.2d 981, 985, aff'd sub nom. Mary Ellen C. v. Joseph William C., 79 A.D.2d 1024,
1024-25, 435 N.Y.S.2d 738, 738 (2d Dep't 1979) (Proceedings abated upon the death of
the putative father.).
126. See Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411, 141 N.E.2d 562, 563, 161
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1957).
127. Middlebrooks v. Hatcher, 55 Misc. 2d at 302, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
128. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW (McKinney 1981). For the complete text of
the statute as it existed then, see supra note 96.
129. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 513 (McKinney 1983) provides in relevant part: "[A]n or-
der of support or a judicially approved settlement made prior to that parent's death shall
be enforceable as a claim against the deceased parent's estate."
130. Middlebrooks v. Hatcher, 55 Misc. 2d at 303, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 258, aff'd sub
nom. Mary Ellen C. v. Joseph William C., 79 A.D.2d 1024, 435 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't
1981).
131. 100 Misc. 2d 270, 418 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1979).
132. Id. at 270-71, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
133. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
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death.' Nevertheless, the court relied on the first ground of
Middlebrooks to dismiss the case.
Concluding that the Family Court Act was "silent with re-
gard to the survival or abatement of the proceeding upon the
death of the putative father,' 1 35 the court held that to extend
the non-abatement statute "would effectively be judicial legisla-
tion."'3 6 Reiterating that the right to maintain a paternity pro-
ceeding exists only by virtue of statutory authority, the court
found nothing "to abrogate the common law rule of abatement
upon the death of the putative father."'' 37 The decision was con-
firmed in Mary Ellen C. v. Joseph William C.. I There the
court held that a paternity proceeding is instituted "to deter-
mine a relationship or status between individuals and, as such, it
is purely personal to the parties.' 39 Thus the cause of action
must have abated prior to the institution of the proceeding." 0
A notable exception to this general rule was Gordon v.
Cole. 4 1 In Cole, the petitioner sought an order of filiation
against a deceased father for the sole purpose of changing the
child's name. The family court considered that purpose "most
laudable,"" 42 and, basing its decision on the complete agreement
of all the involved parties, and the lack of foreseeable harm,
granted the order.", 3 Unlike Middlebrooks and Corbett, Cole
concluded that EPTL section 4-1.2 recognized the power of the
family court to issue an order of filiation after the father's
death."'
134. Corbett v. Corbett, 100 Misc. 2d at 274-75, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
135. Id. at 275, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
136. Id. at 276, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 986 (citing K.K. v. Estate of M.F., 145 N.J. Super.
250, 367 A.2d 466 (1976)).
137. Id. at 277, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
138. 79 A.D.2d 1024, 435 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1981).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1025, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
141. 54 Misc. 2d 967, 283 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
142. Id. at 969, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
143. Id. Cf. Henry v. Rodd, 95 Misc. 2d 996, 997-98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (Fam. Ct.
Queens County 1978) (A strict interpretation of the statute precluded the entry of a
posthumous order of filiation.).
144. Id. Gorden v. Cole, 54 Misc. 2d at 969, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 789. See also In re
Cirillo's Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 799, 802 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1952).
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III. Joseph A. v. Gina L.
A. The Facts
The respondent, Gina L., gave birth to an out-of-wedlock
baby, Jessica, on September 14, 1981. Joseph A., the petitioner,
filed a paternity petition on July 20, 1982. In the petition, he
swore he was the father of Jessica and that he had provided fi-
nancial support for the baby. Before a hearing could be held, the
petitioner was severely injured in a fire. He died as a result of
these injuries on October 2, 1982. On October 13, 1982, the par-
ents of the petitioner, the respondent Gina L. and her mother,
appeared before the court. At that appearance, all parties ex-
pressed a wish to continue the proceedings and to enter an order
of filiation. 14 5
In view of these facts, the court appointed a law guardian to
represent Jessica. Jessica's law guardian filed a second paternity
petition naming Gina L. and Joseph A.'s administratrix as re-
spondents.14 The law guardian challenged the constitutionality
of section 518 of the Family Court Act, which provided for non-
abatement of paternity actions in the event of a mother's, but
not a father's, death. 4 7 At almost the same time as the second
petition was filed, Gina L. filed a third paternity petition. She
named the administratrix of Joseph A.'s estate as respondent. A
hearing on these petitions was held in Westchester Family
Court. The court examined the constitutionality of section 518
and concluded that the proceeding did not abate upon the death
of the putative father."48 The court then entered an order of fili-
ation declaring Joseph A. to be Jessica's father.1 9
145. Joseph A. v. Gina L., 126 Misc. 2d 63, 64, 481 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (Fam. Ct.
Westchester County 1984). Both the respondent and the parent of the deceased peti-
tioner stated that the petitioner had acknowledged paternity of Jessica, given money to
support Jessica, and expressed a last wish that Jessica bear his name. Id.
146. Id., 481 N.Y.S.2d at 205. Petitioner's mother, Maria A., had by order of the
Surrogate of Westchester County, obtained limited letters of administration of the estate
of her son. Among the rights conferred by limited letters of administration is the right to
enforce or prosecute a cause of action in favor of the decedent or his fiduciary under
general or special provisions of the law, and to defend any claim or cause of action
against a decedent or his fiduciary. N.Y. SUR. CT. PROc. ACT § 702(1) (McKinney 1967).
147. Id. at 66, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 206. For the text of the statute, see supra note 8.
148. Id. at 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08.
149. Id. at 69, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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B. The Decision
1. The Current Effect of Family Court Act Section 518
The court began its analysis by recognizing that section 518
of the Family Court Act suggests the court did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear Joseph A.'s petition.' 50 Under section 518, the peti-
tion abated when Joseph A. died. Nevertheless, the court noted
that the legislature had recently codified several decisions that
held that paternity actions do not abate at the death of the
mother, notwithstanding the plain meaning of section 518.'5'
The court considered that this amendment, coupled with an ex-
tension of the time for filing a paternity petition,'52 indicated "a
general trend to expand the opportunities for an individual to
seek a declaration of paternity.' 1 53 As written, section 518 cut
against this trend because it provided for survival of paternity
actions when the mother died, but not when the father died.",
This situation set up a classification subject to scrutiny under
the equal protection clause. 55
In order to withstand scrutiny under the equal protection
clause, the challenged classification must be justified by an im-
portant governmental objective; and the statute must be shown
to be "reasonably related to the achievement of that end.'
156
Judge Facelle could not find any justification in caselaw or in
the purposes of an order of filiation for the unequal treatment of
mothers and fathers under section 518.157
The court rejected the precedential value of earlier decisions
that held that paternity proceedings must abate on the death of
150. See supra note 8 for the text of the statute. See text accompanying notes 113-
44 for a discussion of abatement of paternity proceedings.
151. Act of June 21, 1983, ch. 310, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1664. The amendment clari-
fied the confusion surrounding the question of whether paternity proceedings could com-
mence as well as continue after the death of the mother. See supra notes 116-22 and
accompanying text.
152. Act of June 21, 1983, ch. 310, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1659 (extends to five years
the time in which a mother could commence a paternity proceeding).
153. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 66, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
154. FAM. CT. ACT § 518 (McKinney 1983). Joseph A. 126 Misc. 2d at 66, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 205-06.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11.
156. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 66, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 205-06.
157. Id. at 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
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the putative father.158 These cases were decided at a time when
the New York Estate, Powers and Trusts Law denied illegiti-
mate children the right to inherit from a deceased father. 59
Courts at that time reasoned that a child's inability to inherit
from his deceased father must require abatement of any pater-
nity action.' The EPTL has since been amended giving illegiti-
mate children the right to inherit from a deceased father if spe-
cific statutory criteria are met.'
Judge Facelle also commented that the cases that required
paternity actions to abate on the death of the father paid "too
much homage to the support aspects of a paternity proceed-
ing."' 2 He observed that while support is a primary purpose of
paternity proceedings, it is not the exclusive function.6 3 In sup-
port of this position, the court cited a number of earlier deci-
sions permitting entry of orders of filiation where support was
neither requested nor appropriate. 64 Joseph A. also enumerated
several ways in which these orders have substantive nonfinancial
impact on the lives of the child and third parties.6 5
The court in Joseph A. concluded that the better-reasoned
decisions emphasize the important nonfinancial benefits of or-
ders of filiation. 6 6 At the same time, the court could not find
any justification for the gender discrimination of section 518.167
Consequently, to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal
protection, the court extended the benefits of section 518 to all
158. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 67-68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 206-07.
159. For the text of this law see supra note 96.
160. See supra notes 124-40.
161. Id. at 67, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207. See supra note 120.
162. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 67, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
163. Id. at 67-68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207. But see Czajak v. Vavonese, 104 Misc. 2d 601,
610, 428 N.Y.S.2d 986, 992 (Fam. Ct. Onondaga County 1981) (The primary purpose of
article 5 is to procure support.).
164. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207 (citing Leromain v.
Venduro, 95 A.D.2d 80, 466 N.Y.S.2d 729 (3d Dep't 1983); Kordek v. Wood, 90 A.D.2d
209, 457 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep't 1982); Joye v. Schechter, 112 Misc. 2d 172, 46 N.Y.S.2d
884 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County 1982)). See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
165. Id. Paternity orders ensure that a child has the right to use his father's name,
supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. They also grant rights of custody, visitation
and orders of protection, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 549, 551 (McKinney 1983). As in this
case, a paternity order may also indirectly confer the status of a grandparent, thereby
giving a third party standing to seek an order of visitation. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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parties, reading its provisions as gender-neutral. 6 8
IV. Analysis
A. Constitutional Analysis
The court in Joseph A. correctly concluded that the present
New York non-abatement statute169 can not withstand the scru-
tiny imposed by the equal protection clauses. 7 ' Although this
conclusion is ultimately warranted, the court erred when it con-
cluded that the gender distinctions of section 518 served no im-
portant governmental interest. Once the court decided that the
statute failed this threshold requirement of the equal protection
clauses, it never considered whether section 518 adopted means
that are overly broad. In fact, a gender-neutral reading of the
non-abatement statute is compelled because section 518 utilizes
means that are not substantially related to achieving important
governmental interests.
Joseph A. rejected the argument that the death of a puta-
tive father requires abatement of paternity actions by virtue of a
supposed connection between adjudicating paternity and estab-
lishing a child's right to inherit. 71 Indeed, many of the decisions
announcing that paternity actions extinguish on the death of the
father were primarily concerned with protecting the estates of
putative fathers.1 72 In Middlebrooks v. Hatcher,1 73 the Suffolk
County family court observed that, while the statute governing
filiation proceedings ought to be construed liberally, the New
York State legislature had expressed an intent to avoid post-
death litigation. 174 It found this intent expressed in two types of
statutes. One limited the enforcement of support orders or judi-
cially approved settlements to those which had been made prior
to a parent's death. 75 The other statute provided that the right
of a illegitimate child to inherit from his father depended upon
168. Id., 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08.
169. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 518 (McKinney 1983).
170. Joseph A. v. Gina L., 126 Misc. 2d 63, 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207-08.
171. Id. at 67, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
172. Id., 481 N.Y.S.2d at 206-07.
173. 55 Misc. 2d 301, 285 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. Suffolk County 1967).
174. Id. at 302, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58.
175. Id. at 302, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
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entry of an order of filiation during the lifetime of the father. 7 '
Commenting that an order of filiation declares the relationship
between parties, Mary Ellen C. v. Joseph William C.177 dis-
missed a paternity proceeding commenced after the putative fa-
ther's death, citing cases that sought to protect their estates
against claims from illegitimate children.7 8 Clearly, courts
before Joseph A. implied that protecting the estates of putative
fathers against spurious claims constituted a substantial govern-
mental interest which was sufficient to justify a statute estab-
lishing gender-based distinctions.
In its landmark decision, Lalli v. Lalli,17e the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to enact intestacy
laws which required that filiation proceedings take place during
the lifetime of the father. 80 The Court held that an estate law
which treated legitimate and illegitimate children differently was
justified by a substantial state interest in protecting the proper
disposition of estates.'81 Lalli pointed to two aspects of this le-
gitimate governmental interest. First, the statute protected de-
cedents' estates against false claims. 182 Orders of filiation had to
be brought during the putative father's lifetime assuring his in-
volvement in discrediting fraudulent accusations. 183 Second, the
intestacy law ensured that the estates could be administered
with certainty and without undue delay because the identity of
distributees would be fixed before a decedent's death.184
Joseph A. forthrightly states that it cannot find any justifi-
cation for the gender distinction in section 518.185 While the leg-
islative history of the statute does not explicate the lawmakers'
176. Id. (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.2, amended by Act of Apr. 8,
1981, ch. 67, § 2, 1981 N.Y. Laws 1074, 1074-75.
177. 79 A.D.2d 1024, 1025, 435 N.Y.S.2d 738, 738 (2d Dep't 1981).
178. Id. at 1025 (citing People v. Polep, 233 A.D. 450, 253 N.Y.S.2d 253 (4th Dep't
1931) (denying petition to reopen filiation proceeding after death of the putative father
where petition sought support from the father's estate for the illegitimate child); Mid-
dlebrooks v. Hatcher, 55 Misc. 2d 301, 285 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. Suffolk County 1967);
supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
179. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
180. Id. at 275-76.
181. Id. at 271-74.
182. Id. at 271.
183. Id. at 271-72.
184. Id.
185. Joseph A., 126 Misc. 2d at 68, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
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intent, there may have been concern about spurious paternity
claims and about protecting final distribution of estates. These
interests are substantial and would justify a law which treats
men and women differently.
Although there are substantial state interests justifying the
gender discrimination in section 518, it is equally apparent that
the statute is impermissibly broad. The final result achieved in
Joseph A. can be supported by an analysis which demonstrates
that section 518 adopts a method which is not sufficiently re-
lated to achieving the presumed legitimate governmental
objectives.
In Caban v. Mohammed,186 the Supreme Court announced
that a gender-based distinction withstands scrutiny under the
equal protection clause only if the classification is structured to
achieve the legislative goal and avoids "over-broad generaliza-
tion." 87 There the Court held that a statute was unconstitu-
tional because it gave an unwed mother the right to withhold
consent to adoption of her illegitimate child, but denied the
child's father that same right. 88 This blanket prohibition was
overbroad because the state could enact a more narrowly drawn
statute protecting its interest in promoting the adoption of cer-
tain illegitimate children.' 89 Similarly, the gender classification
in section 518 which creates an absolute abatement of paternity
actions on the death of the putative father is overly broad.
The need to protect against spurious paternity claims is sat-
isfied by requiring petitioners to make a substAntial showing of
evidence in support of their allegations. Petitioners in paternity
proceedings have traditionally been held to a burden of estab-
lishing paternity by clear and convincing evidence.1 90 This stan-
dard "evolved because it has long been recognized that a charge
of paternity is easy to make and hard to disprove."'91 Applica-
186. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
187. Id. at 391, 394.
188. Id. at 394.
189. Id. at 391-92.
190. See, e.g., Lopez v. Sanchez, 34 N.Y.2d 662, 663, 311 N.E.2d 652, 652, 355
N.Y.S.2d 581, 581 (1974); Seeberg v. Davis, 84 A.D.2d 262, 263, 447 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169
(1st Dep't 1982). See also supra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
191. Czajak v. Vavonese, 104 Misc. 2d 601, 609 n.6, 428 N.Y.S.2d 986, 991 n.6 (Fain.
Ct. Onodaga County 1981) (citing Drummond v. Dolan, 155 A.D. 449, 450-51, 140 N.Y.S.
307, 307-08 (1913)).
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tion of this standard denies relief whenever evidence is uncer-
tain, susceptible of more than one interpretation or indefinite. In
fact, the requisite "clear and convincing evidence" demanded in
paternity proceedings is a heavy burden for any petitioner to
meet and goes directly to the issue of defeating spurious pater-
nity claims."9 2
A blanket prohibition of paternity actions after the death of
the putative father will unnecessarily eliminate meritorious peti-
tions such as the request in Joseph A.. If the legislature con-
cludes that the burden of proof established in the case law does
not sufficiently protect against false claims, it is within its power
to amend section 518. A provision which is much narrower than
an absolute prohibition against non-abatement could be
modeled on EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) which permits out-of-wedlock
children to inherit from their fathers if "paternity has been es-
tablished by clear and convincing evidence and the father of the
child has openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his
own." 193 This recent amendment to EPTL demonstrates that
the legislature has already determined that a "clear and convinc-
ing" standard of proof protects adequately against false pater-
nity claims.
B. The Non-Support Order of Filiation
Joseph A. held that "abatement should never be measured
solely in terms of financial considerations. 1 94 It developed a co-
gent argument for abandoning a rule which inextricably links
paternity orders with requests for financial support. Having al-
ready demonstrated the fallacy of making orders of filiation con-
tingent on the right to inherit, Joseph A. highlighted a number
of well-reasoned decisions which emphasize the important nonfi-
nancial benefits of a paternity order. Nonetheless, it must be
conceded that these cases represent a clear departure from
precedent.
It cannot be disputed that non-support orders of filiation
confer important social benefits. In Kordek v. Wood, the Appel-
192. See supra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
193. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) (McKinney 1981).
194. Joseph A. v. Gina L., 126 Misc. 2d 63, 67, 481 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Fain. Ct.
Westchester County 1984).
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late Division of the Fourth Department took the unusual action
of reinstating a nonsupport order of filiation stating "the child's
needs for support no longer bears a nexus to the granting of...
an order [of filiation]." '95 In doing so, the court attached great
importance to the rights which may accompany orders of filia-
tion, including orders of custody or visitation, rights of inheri-
tance, rights to recover benefits, and the right of notice of adop-
tion proceedings. 96 In addition to these substantive rights,
courts have come to value the emotional and social benefits that
follow an adjudication of paternity. Brooks v. Willie underscores
the obvious benefit to a child of removing the social stigma of
illegitimacy by allowing him to use his father's name.1 97 The
court in Joye v. Schechter gave voice to the growing contempo-
rary view that proceedings to establish paternity need not be
linked with proceedings to compel support.'98 This position finds
support from a plain reading of article 5 of the Family Court
Act. That portion of the statute confers authority on a court,
adjudicating paternity, to grant custody, visitation and support
orders. However, article 5 may be interpreted as granting the
discretion to make any of these orders rather than mandating
consideration of any one of them.
Despite all of the arguments for permitting nonfinancial or-
ders of filiation, Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Koehler'9"
remains good law in New York. There, the Court of Appeals
stated that the purpose of orders of filiation is to fix an obliga-
tion to support the child.200 As long as adjudication of paternity
remains linked with a father's financial obligations to his child,
there is a reason to question the validity of non-support orders
of filiation and to fear that post-death paternity orders may give
rise to inequitable claims against his estate.
195. 90 A.D.2d 209, 213, 457 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (4th Dep't 1982).
196. Id. at 212, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
197. 117 Misc. 2d 640, 645-46, 458 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863-64 (Faro. Ct. Suffolk County
1983).
198. 112 Misc. 2d 172, 178, 446 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (Faro. Ct. Nassau County 1982).
199. 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E.2d 587 (1940).
200. Id. at 266-67, 30 N.E.2d at 590-91.
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V. Conclusion
Through a gender-neutral reading of Family Court Act sec-
tion 518, Joseph A. v. Gina L. extended the jurisdiction of the
family court to commence and continue paternity proceedings
after the death of the putative father. The court validly recog-
nized that recent decisions have focused upon the non-financial
aspects of paternity actions granting orders of filiation without
the accompanying support orders.
But a gender-neutral reading of section 518 is not enough.
The door is now open for both the Joseph A. type of paternity
proceeding and a proceeding which seeks support as well. In the
aftermath of Joseph A., the legislature must provide more spe-
cific guidelines for paternity proceedings which are commenced
or which continue after the death of the putative father. The
courts and those who practice before them must understand
when demands for support in paternity petitions are necessary,
appropriate or superfluous. This clarification is an essential next
step in the evolution of modern paternity proceedings.
Amy Baldwin Littman
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